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I. INTRODUCTION 
 A surety faces potential exposure to a multitude of liabilities under payment and 
performance bonds issued for state and federally funded bonded projects as well as from the 
express obligations imposed by private common law performance and payment bonds.  This 
paper, however, focuses only on a surety’s potential exposure for wage and related liabilities.   
  
Under federal law, a surety faces possible liability under a Miller Act Payment Bond to 
laborers for the bonded principal’s failure to pay wages.  Union trusts may also recover against 
a surety under a Miller Act Payment Bond for the bonded principal’s failure to remit union dues 
and benefit fund contributions.  Still further, liability may arise under a Miller Act Performance 
Bond to the federal government for the bonded principal’s failure to remit withholding taxes on 
employee wages.   
 
A surety is also exposed to wage liability under the Davis-Bacon Act for the bonded 
principal’s failure to pay the prevailing wage rate to laborers on a bonded project.  Importantly, 
however, unlike a direct action against a surety under a Miller Act Payment Bond, an action 
against a surety predicated on a Davis-Bacon Act violation requires exhaustion of 
administrative remedies delineated in the Davis-Bacon Act prior to a laborer seeking judicial 
relief.   
 
Under state law, a surety faces similar wage liability to that described above under the 
Little Miller Acts or prevailing wage laws of the particular state in which the bonded project is 
located.  Moreover, under state law, a surety faces wage and related liabilities under the 
express terms of various common law bond forms - most often the 1984 and 2010 AIA 312 
Payment Bond and Performance Bond.  Notably, in certain states, courts have determined that 
the terms of a common law payment bond also impose liability on a surety for the principal’s 
unpaid withholding taxes.  Thus, the wage and related liabilities imposed on a surety under 
state law are akin to those imposed by federal law. 
 
Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to give the surety a basic understanding of the basis 
for wage and related liabilities under federal, state and common law.  A comprehensive 
analysis of all relevant federal and state statutes, bond forms and the ever evolving related 
federal and state case law, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
II. WAGE AND RELATED LIABILITY UNDER THE MILLER ACT 
A. The Miller Act 
 The Miller Act requires a prime contractor on a federal construction project to post both 
a performance bond and a payment bond on any contract awarded by the federal government 
exceeding $100,000 “for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building or public 
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work[.]”1  The Miller Act “is highly remedial in nature.... and is entitled to a liberal construction 
and application in order properly to effectuate the Congressional intent to protect those whose 
labor and materials go into public projects.”2  Importantly, federal law, not state law, governs 
“the scope of the remedy afforded by the Miller Act.”3   
 
 B. Liability for Wages under a Miller Act Payment Bond 
A Miller Act Payment Bond is designed to provide security to laborers and materialmen 
on a federal construction project by creating “a federal cause of action to satisfy any deficiency 
in payment by the prime contractor,” because such “suppliers are precluded from filing liens on 
government facilities[.]”4  The Miller Act Payment Bond remedy, therefore, provides relief 
similar to “mechanics’ liens ordinarily available on private construction projects.”5  Laborers 
seeking recovery under the Miller Act may obtain unpaid wages, defined as “the basic hourly 
rate of pay.” 6   
 
A Miller Act Payment Bond claim is strictly limited to first and second tier 
subcontractors.7  In other words, “those with a contractual relationship with the prime 
contractor or with a subcontractor.”8  Thus, third tier subcontractors and below are expressly 
excluded from recovery under direct actions against a Miller Act Payment Bond.9    Relevant to 
this paper, only laborers of a first tier subcontractor may assert a claim against a Miller Act 
Payment Bond.10  This results because a laborer of a first tier subcontractor is not in privity 
with the prime contractor and, therefore, classified as a second tier subcontractor.11  
Accordingly, an individual laborer of a second tier subcontractor will be considered, at best, a 
third tier subcontractor and not eligible to make a claim on a Miller Act Payment Bond.12 
 
                                                          
1
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3131(b). 
 
2
  U.S. for Use & Benefit of Olson v. W.H. Cates Const. Co., 972 F.2d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 
3
  Id. at 991. 
 
4
  United States v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2000); 40 U.S.C.A. § 3133 (b). 
 
5
  U.S. ex rel. Polied Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Incor Grp., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (D. Conn. 2002).   
 
6
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3141(2)(A). 
 
7
  U.S. ex rel. Polied Envtl. Servs., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 459. 
 
8
  Id.  First tier subcontractors are in direct privity with the prime contractor.  Second tier subcontractors, i.e., 
sub-subcontractors, are in direct privity with the first tier subcontractor, but not the prime contractor.   
 
9
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3133 (b); U.S. for Use of Barber-Colman Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 19 F.3d 1431, at *3 
(4th Cir. 1994) (“the Supreme Court has construed the Act as excluding third-tier sub-contractors from recovery”). 
 
10
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3133 (b). 
 
11
  See id. 
 
12
  See id.  Generally, subcontractors are required to maintain their own bonds, which is the primary avenue 
to recover unpaid wages for individual laborers of lower-tier subcontractors. 
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A Miller Act Payment Bond claim may be brought against the prime contractor, the 
surety and the first tier subcontractor, by a lower tier claimant.13  In order to establish a prima 
facie claim under the Miller Act, a claimant must prove: 
 
(1) the labor or materials were supplied in prosecution of the work provided in the 
contract; (2) the supplier has not been paid; (3) the supplier had a good faith 
belief that the labor or materials were intended for the specified work; and (4) the 
jurisdictional requisites of the Miller Act have been met.  
 
Id. at 460. 
The time period in which to assert a Miller Act Payment Bond claim for wages is very 
narrow.  Initially, such a claim does not ripen into a cause of action until “90 days after the day 
on which the person did or performed the last of the labor… for which the claim is made[.]”14  
Notably, a first tier subcontractor is not required to provide the prime contractor written notice 
of the claim prior to initiating a lawsuit.  See id.  By contrast, a second tier subcontractor must 
provide written notice to the prime contractor 90 days prior to asserting a claim against a 
surety under a Miller Act Payment Bond – there is no requirement any notice be given to the 
surety.15  A Miller Act Payment Bond claim for wages is statutorily barred “one year after the 
day on which the last of the labor was performed[.]”16  In essence, there is only a nine month 
window after the claimant’s last day of labor to file suit against a surety under a Miller Act 
Payment Bond. 
 
Generally, there is no set criteria to determine the date of the last day of labor under the 
Miller Act, but courts agree it “connotes more than mere substantial completion or substantial 
performance of the plaintiff’s obligations under its contract[.]”17  Interestingly, at least one court 
has permitted a first tier subcontractor to measure its last day of performance from the last day 
of a second tier subcontractor’s performance.18  By contrast, however, it is well-settled that a 
second tier subcontractor is prohibited from measuring the limitations period from the last day 
its sub-subcontractor’s, i.e., 3rd tier subcontractor, complete performance.19  It is also 
noteworthy that courts reject the position, for the reasons discussed infra, that work completed 
after inspection and acceptance pursuant to a warranty does not extend the last day of labor.20  
This results because if “post-completion work performed pursuant to a warranty could toll the 
                                                          
13
  U.S. ex rel. Polied Envtl. Servs., Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 461.   
 
14
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3133(b)(1). 
 
15
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3133(b)(2).   
 
16
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3133(b)(4). 
 
17
  Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d at 459. 
 
18
  United States ex rel. H.T. Sweeney & Son, Inc. v. E.J.T. Constr. Co., 415 F.Supp. 1328 (D. Del.1976). 
 
19
  U.S. for Use of Barber-Colman Co., 19 F.3d at *4. 
 
20
  Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d at 459. 
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Miller Act’s statute of limitations, then the surety would have no repose until all such warranties 
expired.”21   
  
The term “labor” is also undefined by or otherwise “self-evident” from the Miller Act’s 
language.  Generally, courts construe the term “labor” to include “physical toil, but not work by 
a professional, such as an architect or engineer[.]”22  The work of a skilled professional, 
however, may fall under the Miller Act if a particular skilled professional “actually superintends 
the work as it is done on the job site.”23  The Eight Circuit explained: 
 
It may be true that the term ‘labor’ in this statute, as generally in statutes relating 
to mechanics’ liens, refers to physical labor rather than technical and 
professional skill and judgment, but an architect or other skilled man who actually 
superintends the work as it is done is by the weight of authority furnishing 
labor…24 
 
Courts further recognize that labor may include “a consulting engineer responsible for 
inspecting a job while in progress.”25  Similarly, “the on-site supervisory work of a project 
manager falls within the purview of the Miller Act if such a superintendent did some physical 
labor at the job site or might have been called upon to do some on-site manual work in the 
regular course of his job.”26  In sum, only on-site labor and on-site supervisory work on an 
ongoing, non-completed project are covered by a Miller Act Payment Bond. 
 
It is well-settled that “labor” under the Miller Act does not include corrective, remedial or 
warranty work.27  In analyzing Miller Act claims, the majority rule applied by courts “requires 
the trier of fact to distinguish whether the work was performed ... as a ‘part of the original 
contract’ or for the ‘purpose of correcting defects, or making repairs following inspection of the 
project.”28  The majority rule is referred to as the “correction-or-repair versus original-contract 
test.”  On this point, the Sixth Circuit opined: 
                                                          
21
  Id. at 459. 
 
22




  Id. at 1158; U.S. for Use of Barber-Colman Co., 19 F.3d at *3 (“an architect or engineer can only recover 
on the payment bond ... to the extent that [he] performed on-site services”) (citations and quotations omitted). 
 
24
  U.S. for Use & Benefit of Olson, 972 F.2d at 990 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 
25
  U. S. for Use & Benefit of Naberhaus-Burke, Inc., 535 F. Supp. at 1158 (emphasis added); U.S. for Use & 
Benefit of Olson, 972 F.2d at 990 (“only certain professional supervisory work is covered by the Miller Act, 
namely, skilled professional work which involves actual superintending, supervision, or inspection at the job site”) 
(citations and quotations omitted); cf Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d at 460 (“inspection of work already completed, 
falls outside the meaning of labor”).   
 
26
  U.S. for Use & Benefit of Olson, 972 F.2d at 991. 
 
27
  Id. (“in connection with the completion of the project and not for the purpose of correcting defects”); Int’l 
Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d at 459 (work performed under warranty subsequent to completion, inspection and 
acceptance not covered by Miller Act Payment Bond). 
 
28
  Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 200 F.3d at 460 (citations and quotations omitted). 
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Although this line of inquiry has received criticism, this Court concludes the 
correction-or-repair versus original-contract test presents a useful framework to 
determine when the Miller Act’s statute of limitations begins to run. As set forth in 
[United States ex rel. Austin v. Western Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 568 (9th Cir.1964)], 
the correction-or-repair versus original-contract test provides a bright-line rule 
from which each interested party—the government, contractor, subcontractor, 
and surety—can gain a clear understanding of what work constitutes labor under 
[the Miller Act]. Furthermore, the majority rule induces the parties to structure 
their contractual obligations to account for the statute of limitations. Although the 
liberal purposes of the Miller Act may not be effectuated in each and every case, 
the benefits of certainty and administrability afforded by a bright-line rule here 
outweigh the inherent risk of over or under inclusive results presented by bright-
line rules.29  
 
Finally, and tangentially related to wage liability, courts have declined to extend the 
scope of a Miller Act Payment Bond to cover worker’s compensation awards.  The Fourth 
Circuit explained: 
 
We do not think, however, that the most liberal construction would justify the 
holding that a [worker’s] compensation award is within its coverage. Such an 
award is not within the language of the statute as it is neither labor nor materials; 
and it clearly does not fall within the legislative purpose which was to provide for 
those supplying labor and materials for government construction protection 
equivalent to that furnished in the case of private construction by mechanics and 
materialmen’s liens.30 
 
C. Liability for Union Benefits under a Miller Act Payment Bond 
Unions and their related benefit and trust funds31 (hereinafter collectively described as 
“unions” unless otherwise specified) are frequent claimants on Miller Act payment bonds.  
Such claims usually follow an audit prompted by missed monthly wage and fringe reports and 
remittances.  While the case law is not entirely consistent, U.S. ex rel. Sherman v. Carter,32 is 
often cited for the proposition that a surety may be liable for certain amounts due to unions and 
unpaid by bonded principals.  Subsequent case law has carved out certain exceptions to this 
broad sweep of liability. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
29
  Id. 
 
30
  U.S., for Use of Gibson v. Harman, 192 F.2d 999, 1000-1001 (4th Cir. 1951); see also U.S. for Use & 
Benefit of Cobb-Strecker-Dunphy & Zimmerman, Inc. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 894 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(insurer unable to recover principal’s unpaid worker’s compensation premiums under Miller Act Payment Bond). 
 
31
  In addition to unions, who collect dues, common benefit funds include, but are not limited to, health 
insurance funds, pension funds, severance and annuity funds, vacation savings trusts, apprenticeship and 
training committees, management and cooperation committees. 
 
32
  33 U.S. 210 (1957). 
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The Miller Act defines a claimant as “[e]very person that has furnished labor or material 
in carrying out work provided for in a contract for which a payment bond is furnished under 
section 3131 of this title and that has not been paid in full within 90 days.”33  Unions clearly do 
not qualify as “claimants” on their own.  They contribute no labor or materials to the bonded 
project.  Standing for these entities has evolved through a combination of Miller Act case law, 
especially U.S. ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, and the contractual arrangements between Unions 
and union employers, who did in fact contribute labor to the bonded project, by and through its 
employees.   
 
Multiple courts have found that amounts payable to unions, known as fringes, are part 
of the wages payable to the laborers who did contribute work to the bonded project.34  
Expanding the definition of “wages,” which are near indisputably within the scope of sureties’ 
payment bond exposure, to include these additional amounts opens up the door to claims from 
unanticipated parties and for additional amounts.   
 
Unlike wages, union employers typically agree to pay fringes and dues directly to the 
unions.35  Moreover, union workers assign, usually expressly, the portion of their wages 
intended to cover fringes and also union dues to collection agents for the unions.  As a result, 
union employers make lump sum remittances to the unions rather than union members being 
required to submit those payments on their own.  For each individual union or trust, the 
amounts due are calculated based on an employee’s hours or wages during the remittance 
period as opposed to fixed premiums or sliding scale withholdings, so they can readily be 
processed separately from the employer’s payroll itself. 
 
Permitting unions to pursue payment bond claims in their own names represents a 
substantial deviation from the plain language of the Miller Act, but serves to reach the intended 
ends of the Miller Act by ensuring that project laborers are fully compensated.  An argument 
can reasonably be made that the claims by the unions must disclose on notices and pleadings 
the names of the workers for whom they are seeking to collect.  The Miller Act contemplates 
that the claimant, himself or itself, will bring an action and give the requisite notice, thereby 
providing sufficient identification.36  A surety cannot readily investigate a payment bond claim 
without this basic information.   
 
Unions may also make wage claims on behalf of individual union members which would 
be analyzed consistently with Section 1.A., supra, with the added requirement of a written 
assignment.  Notably, unions do not typically advance wages to their members who have not 
been paid by the bonded principal employing the union labor, so additional steps are required 
                                                          
33
  40 U.S.C. § 3133(b)(1). 
 
34
  See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Sherman v. Carter, 33 U.S. 210, 218-220 (1957); see also Nat’l Elec. Ind. Fund v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 296 Md. 541 (1983) (regarding mechanic’s lien standing, but also applicable to and 




  Nat’l Elec. Ind. Fund v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 296 Md. 541 (1983). 
 
36
  40 U.S.C. § 3133(b). 
 
 
{00317096v.5 (WCS.GENERAL)} 7 
 
to establish standing for those claims.  The union can only assert its members claims insofar 
as those individuals could bring them directly.37   
 
Union employers’ obligations to pay fringes arise from their collective bargaining 
agreements (“CBA”) with the unions, which set forth formulas and rates.  A CBA generally 
governs the employment terms between the employer and union workers and is in effect for a 
period of many years.    A CBA may predate a bonded project and often bears no relation 
whatsoever to a specific bonded project.    
 
Unions utilize the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act38 (ERISA) to 
enforce CBA’s against employers.  ERISA provides a spectrum of remedies for union 
employees and their representative unions, including but not limited to, unpaid wages, unpaid 
benefit plan contributions, liquidated damages, interest, and attorney’s fees.39  Most 
importantly, ERISA permits a union fiduciary to bring claims on behalf of the union and its 
affiliates, as well as the affected employees, thereby making it more efficient and worthwhile to 
pursue what would be otherwise cost-prohibitive individual claims.40  ERISA has broad 
preemptive power by its own terms,41 but is rarely read to preempt bond claims, which touch 
on ERISA only tangentially.42 
 
Unions have frequently attempted to assert a surety’s liability under ERISA predicated 
upon a broad interpretation of the term “employer,” which is defined as “any person acting 
directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an employee 
benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting for an employer in such 
capacity.”43 Most, but not all, courts have refused to exercise such an interpretation that would 
place a surety within the scope of “employers.”44  One court acknowledged the complete 
disconnect between the surety and the suing union benefit plan in declining to lump the surety 
in as an employer for ERISA liability, “[T]he duties or obligations assumed by [the surety] were 
not ‘in relation to an employee benefit plan’ at all, but instead ‘in relation to’ one of [the 
                                                          
37
  U.S. ex rel. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union 692 v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 523, 525 
(E.D. Mich. 1992).  (“The union's claim is coextensive with and no greater than would be the individual employee's 
claim had it been necessary for the employee to file a claim for wages under the Miller Act.”) 
 
38
  29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. 
 
39
  ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 
40
  ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
 
41
  29 U.S.C § 1144(a). 
 
42
  See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68F.3d 561, 573-575 (2d Cir. 1995); Forsberg v. 
Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 184 P.3d 610, 620-621 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Bd. Of Trustees of Operating Engineers 
Local 825 Fund Service Facilities v. L.B.S. Constr. Co., 148 N.J. 561 (1997).  
 
43
  29 U.S.C. § 1002(5). 
 
44
  See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68F.3d 561, 575-576 (2d Cir. 1995); Xaros v. 
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 820 F. 2d 1176, 1180 (11th  Cir. 1987); Ragan v. Tri County Excavating, 62 F.3d 501, 
512-513 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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principal’s] projects.  As the connection between the surety bond and the benefit plan is a 
secondary one, it is insufficient to transform [the surety] into an ERISA ‘employer.’”45   
 
The Labor Management Relations Act46 supplements ERISA by providing federal 
jurisdiction for unions’ ERISA claims and is often cited by unions in their pursuit of contractors 
and sureties.47  However, with respect to sureties, courts have consistently rejected this 
approach, concluding that the Labor Management Relations Act applies exclusively to 
signatories of the applicable CBA.48   
 
 A surety faced with a claim from a union is best served by raising a variety of different 
defenses.  Depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, appropriate 
defenses may include lack of compliance with bond or statutory notice requirements, 
inapplicability of ERISA or the Labor Management Relations Act, and limited scope or 
coverage of the bond.  Customary defenses, including untimely notice and suit, will also be 
available where supported by the facts.  It is common for unions to conduct audits of their 
employers after fringe remittances become delinquent.  Until that audit is complete, a union 
representative will likely not have sufficient information to give proper and sufficient notice and 
sureties should be mindful of those deficiencies which may give rise to defenses.  It is also 
advisable to obtain and review payroll records and project daily sheets to ensure that wage 
and wage-related claims are properly attributable to the bonded project and not lumped 
together with others. 
 
D. Liability for Taxes under a Miller Act Performance Bond 
A Miller Act Performance Bond is required to contain language stating that the surety 
“shall provide coverage for taxes the Government imposes which are collected, deducted, or 
withheld from wages the contractor pays in carrying out the contract with respect to which the 
bond is furnished.”49  To the extent the bond principal fails to withhold and remit the relevant 
taxes to the federal government, the government must notify the surety of the deficiency 
“within 90 days after the date when the contractor files a return for the period” but “no later 
than 180 days from the date when a return for the period was required to be filed[.]”50  
Regarding the level of government notice required, the Fourth Circuit has held the Miller Act 
“does not require the government to detail with specificity the contracts, bonds, and amount of 
delinquent taxes.  All [§ 3131(c)(2)] requires is timely notice of the contractor’s default so the 
                                                          
45




  29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. 
 
47
  29 U.S.C. § 185. 
 
48
  See, e.g., Greenblatt v. Delta Plumbing & Heating Corp., 68F.3d 561, 572-573 (2d Cir. 1995); Int’l Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895. 897-898 (4th Cir. 1992); Xaros v. U.S. 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 820 F. 2d 1176, 1180-1181 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 
49
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3131(c)(1).   
 
50
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3131(c)(2).   
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surety is aware that payment from such contractor is not forthcoming.”51  Subject to satisfying 
the notice requirements, the federal government must bring an action on the Miller Act 
Performance Bond against the surety to recover unpaid taxes within “one year after the day on 
which notice [is] given” to the surety.52 
   
 Pre-judgment interest on tax liability is, in certain circumstances, permitted under the 
Miller Act.  In United States v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Cas. Co., a bonded principal filed a quarterly 
employment tax return reporting a tax liability but entered into Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
reorganization prior to satisfying its tax liability.53  To recover the unpaid employment taxes, the 
federal government filed a lawsuit against the surety.  The United States District Court for the 
District of South Carolina entered judgment in favor of the government in the amount of taxes 
accrued on the bonded contracts but denied pre-judgment interest.  See id. at 371.  The 
government appealed. 
 
Regarding the denial of prejudgment interest, the Fourth Circuit opined that because 
“neither the Miller Act nor any other applicable federal provision provides any explicit standards 
for the allowance of pre-judgment interest, it is treated as incorporating the applicable state law 
on this issue.”54  In reversing the district court on this issue, the Fourth Circuit held that if state 
law allows an award of prejudgment interest “where amount sued for is liquated,” the Miller Act 
permits prejudgment interest on unpaid employment tax liability because employment taxes 
become a “sum certain” at the time they are withheld, and otherwise, “can be calculated based 
on federal tax tables.”55  Moreover, “liability for payment of [employment] taxes attach[es] at 
the time the wages [are] paid.”56  The Fourth Circuit further opined: 
 
The entire structure of the Miller Act makes it clear that it was enacted to protect 
the United States Government from the loss it would have to bear as a result of a 
defaulting contractor’s failure to meet all obligations. Timely payment of taxes is 
required by law. When such taxes are not timely paid, the government sustains a 
quantifiable loss that… can be measured by the amount withheld by [the bonded 
principal] for work done on the secured contracts. The recovery of interest on 
such delinquent funds fairly compensates the government for the loss of such 
monies as well as the expense incurred in retrieving it. We believe that the Miller 
Act requires a surety to bear the burden of compensating the government for the 
interest and penalties incurred on unpaid taxes when, as here, that amount is 
liquidated and the applicable state law allows for such recovery. The denial of 
that sum, if not for some other valid reason, constitutes an abuse of discretion on 
the part of the district court.57 
                                                          
51
  United States v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Cas. Co., 901 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 
52
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3131(c)(3). 
 
53
  901 F.2d at 372.   
 
54
  Id. at 372-73. 
 
55
  Id. at 373.   
 
56
  Id.   
 
57
  Id.  
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 Notably, Maryland and Virginia expressly permit the award of prejudgment interest.58  
Thus, Am. Mfrs. Mut. Cas. Co. will generally be controlling on this issue on Miller Act 
Performance Bonds issued in Maryland or Virginia.  It should be further noted that the District 
of Columbia also permits the award of prejudgment interest.59   
 
III. Liability for Wages under the Davis-Bacon Act60 
The Davis-Bacon Act applies to “every contract in excess of $2,000, to which the 
Federal Government or the District of Columbia is a party, for construction, alteration, or repair, 
including painting and decorating, of public buildings and public works of the Government or 
the District of Columbia… and which requires or involves the employment of mechanics or 
laborers[.]”61  The particular federal agency entering into such a contract bears the initial 
responsibility for determining whether its contract is subject to the Davis-Bacon Act.62   
 
Section 1 of the Davis-Bacon Act requires government contractors to pay laborers “the 
appropriate prevailing wage rate[.]”63  The prevailing wage rate “shall be based on the wages 
the Secretary of Labor determines to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers 
and mechanics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work in the civil 
subdivision of the State in which the work is to be performed[.]”64  Essentially, the Davis-Bacon 
Act is a minimum wage law benefiting construction workers.65  As such, the Davis-Bacon Act is 
not designed to benefit government contractors, “but rather to protect their employees from 
substandard earnings.”66  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
58
  Md. Const. art. III, § 57; Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 91 Md. App. 123, 188 (1992). 
Va. Code Ann. §§ 6.2-302 and 8.01-382; Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Const. Co.orporated/Poole & 
Kent, 275 Va. 41, 64 (2008). 
 
59
  D.C. Code § 15-108; 601 F. Supp. 2d 262, 276 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 
60
  The Maryland Prevailing Wage Law is the state counterpart to the Davis Bacon Act and applies to 
projects funded by Maryland State equal to or exceeding $500,000.00.  See Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 
17-201 et seq. Notably, eighteen states have no prevailing wage law – Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia.  See http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/dollar.htm.  As noted in this 
section, the District of Columbia is subject to the Davis-Bacon Act. 
 
61
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3142(a); 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a). 
 
62
  Universities Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 760 (1981).   
 
63
  Id.; U.S. for Benefit & on Behalf of Glynn v. Capeletti Bros., 621 F.2d 1309, 1313 (5th Cir. 1980); 40 
U.S.C. § 3142 (b).   
 
64
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3142 (b).     
 
65




  Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Binghamton Const. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 177 (1954)). 
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In order for a laborer to recover unpaid Davis-Bacon wages, the Department of Labor 
must render an administrative determination, on its own or after receiving a claim from a 
laborer, that the wages paid are below the prevailing wage rate and, therefore, additional 
wages are owed to cure the deficiency.67  If such a determination is rendered, Section 1 
permits the relevant administrative agency to withhold accrued contract funds to rectify the 
wage deficiency.68  The appropriate federal agency then “shall pay directly to laborers and 
mechanics from any accrued payments withheld under the terms of a contract any wages 
found to be due laborers and mechanics[.]”69  This administrative scheme is an attempt to 
strike a “careful balance” by “providing contractors with a predictable basis upon which to 
estimate labor costs, and laborers with an effective means to enforce wage stipulations in 
contracts.”70   
 
If funds accrued and withheld pursuant to an administrative determination are 
insufficient to fully reimburse an underpaid laborer, a laborer has “the same right to bring a civil 
action and intervene against the contractor and the contractor’s sureties as is conferred by law 
on persons furnishing labor or materials.”71  Specifically, Section 3 of the Davis-Bacon Act 
confers an express “right of action on employees to recover from the contractor the amount 
due the employees under the minimum wage schedule” under a Miller Act Payment Bond if the 
withholding provisions of Section 1 fail to generate sufficient funds to cure the wage 
deficiency.72  It is crucial to understand, however, that the Davis-Bacon Act requires 
exhaustion of the Section 1 administrative remedy provisions prior to asserting a private cause 
of action on a Miller Act Payment Bond under Section 3 against a prime contractor or surety.73    
In this regard, federal courts have stated: 
 
This private right of action is designed to ensure that the unpaid laborer is able to 
recover what is due him. But, this purely financial remedy is available only after 
there has been an administrative determination that some money is owed and 
that insufficient funds have been withheld to compensate the affected laborer.74 
 
A claim for Davis-Bacon wages through a Miller Act Payment Bond is limited to the 
difference between the applicable prevailing wage rate and the wages actually paid.  Such an 
action is distinguishable from direct actions against a Miller Act Payment Bond, discussed 
                                                          
67
  U.S. ex rel. Bradbury v. TLT Const. Corp., 138 F. Supp. 2d 237, 241 (D.R.I. 2001). 
 
68
  See 40 U.S.C.A. § 3142(c)(3); 29 C.F.R. § 5.5(a)(2);  U.S. ex rel. Bradbury, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 241. 
 
69
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3144(a)(1).   
 
70
  Binghamton Const. Co., 347 U.S.at 176, n.12. 
 
71
  40 U.S.C.A. § 3144 (a)(2). 
 
72
  Castro v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of  Maryland, No. CV 13-818 (JEB), 2014 WL 495464, at *4 (citing United 
States v. Binghamton Const. Co., 347 U.S. at 176 n.12); 40 U.S.C. § 3142. 
 
73
  U.S. ex rel. Bradbury v. TLT Const. Corp., 138 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (“The plain language of the Davis–
Bacon Act clearly contemplates that suits pursuant to § 3 may be brought after an administrative determination 
that such money is owed.”). 
 
74
  See id at 241.   
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supra section II.B, for failure to pay any wages or failure to pay wages agreed to in a contract 
that exceed the Davis-Bacon Act prevailing wage rates, because an administrative 
determination that a Davis-Bacon minimum wage violation occurred is not required for 
recovery in those actions.   
 
Regarding the statutory exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement under 
Section 1, U.S. ex rel. Bradbury v. TLT Const. Corp., provides an example of one of the more 
restrictive interpretations of the Davis-Bacon Act.75  In Bradbury, the plaintiff sought to recover 
directly against the prime contractor’s Miller Act Payment Bond in federal district court the 
difference in wages paid by his employer/subcontractor and the prevailing wage rate set by the 
Secretary of Labor for the type of work the plaintiff performed – prior to obtaining an 
administrative determination under Section 1 that unpaid wages were owed.  Initially, the court 
rejected plaintiff’s argument that such an administrative determination was not required 
because “plaintiff’s case turns on whether a Davis-Bacon Act violation occurred.  Therefore, 
plaintiff’s claim is properly classified as a Miller Act claim brought to recover unpaid Davis-
Bacon Act wages.”76  The court opined that in such circumstances “it is clear that Congress 
consciously decided that a laborer cannot bring an action against a contractor’s Miller Act bond 
for unpaid Davis–Bacon Act wages until after he has received an administrative determination 
that he is owed unpaid wages and that insufficient funds have been withheld to compensate 
him.”77    Although the court found the plaintiff did not have a direct action against the Miller Act 
Payment Bond, because the plaintiff had set forth the requisite elements of a Miller Act 
Payment Bond claim for a Davis-Bacon violation, the court did not dismiss the lawsuit.78  
Rather, the court merely stayed the action pending the plaintiff’s attempt to obtain the requisite 
administrative determination that wages were owed to him under Section 1 of the Davis-Bacon 
Act.79   
 
In Castro v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia provided a consistent but less stringent reading of the administrative remedy 
exhaustion requirements.80  There, laborers for a third-tier subcontractor filed an administrative 
complaint with the Department of Labor asserting a Davis-Bacon Act minimum wage 
violation.81  The underlying project, however, had previously been completed and all payments 
released to the prime contractor.  As such, “the DOL investigator closed the case without 
making further findings on Plaintiffs’ eligibility for relief under the” Davis-Bacon Act because 
                                                          
75
  138 F. Supp. 2d 237. 
 
76
  See id. at 240.   
 
77
  Id. at 243. 
 
78
  See. id. at 245.   
 
79
  See id. 
 
80
  2014 WL 495464. 
 
81
  Interestingly, Castro also provides another distinction between Miller Act Payment Bond actions 
predicated on Davis-Bacon Act violations and direct actions on the Miller Act Payment Bond in that the Castro 
plaintiffs were employees of a third-tier subcontractor who would be barred on the latter type of action. 
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“there were no further payments the government could withhold.”82 Plaintiffs then initiated a 
lawsuit in federal district court.  Defendants asserted that because the plaintiffs failed to obtain 
the requisite administrative determination that wages were owed under the Davis-Bacon Act, 
the court was without subject-matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed.  In response, 
the court reviewed numerous opinions from sister courts in which the “formulaic fulfillment” of 
the Bradbury prerequisites were rejected and, instead, “focused principally on the requirement 
that employees allege that they made a demand on DOL, but were unable to collect due to 
insufficient funds.”83  Following this reasoning, the Castro court found that the Section 1 
administrative remedy requirement may be satisfied without the requisite determination if a 
plaintiff makes a “concerted effort to exhaust administrative remedies with DOL” and only 
seeks relief in the courts “if funds are found to be insufficient.”84  Because the Castro plaintiffs 
sought a Davis-Bacon violation determination but were unable to obtain administrative relief 
solely because no contract funds remained, the court found “[t]o refuse jurisdiction… would be 
overly technical and risk undermining the very purpose of the DBA and corresponding bond 
statutes.”85  In determining it had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims, the court stated: 
 
A rigid approach to § 3144(a) jurisdiction, as a consequence, might mean that a 
genuinely aggrieved employee could not pursue any avenue to recovery unless 
DOL makes a full set of administrative findings. In addition, refusal to entertain 
DBA claims in situations like this one may create a perverse incentive for 
contractors to breach their wage obligations at the end of a project’s lifespan, in 
hopes that employees will not report the problem until after final payments have 
been made and any withholdings have been released.86 
 
Although Castro offers a less strict interpretation of Section 1’s administrative remedy 
requirements than Bradbury, it should not be read to significantly expand the private cause of 
action under Section 3.  Initially, Castro is in accord with Bradbury in that a plaintiff must first 
seek administrative remedies before pursuing judicial relief.  It is important to note that in 
Castro no finding was made by the Department of Labor that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
unpaid Davis-Bacon wages.  Rather, the Department of Labor declined to make any finding as 
to entitlement to Davis-Bacon wages. Castro, therefore, only deviates from Bradbury to the 
extent it permitted an aggrieved laborer to seek judicial relief in the absence of any 
administrative determination solely because no contract funds remained to withhold and 
reimburse the underpaid laborer.   
 
IV. Wage and Related Liabilities under Little Miller Acts 
Surety liability for wage and wage-related claims under state Little Miller Acts is similar 
in substance to liability under the Miller Act.  In fact, Little Miller Acts often follow the Miller Act 
                                                          
82
  See id. at *1-2. 
 
83
  See id. at *4.   
 
84
  See id. at*5.   
 
85
  See id.   
 
86
  See id. at *5 (emphasis in original). 
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and state courts across the country routinely rely on federal case law when interpreting their 
respective Little Miller Act.87 
 
The scope of potential claimants, by tier and type of contribution to the project, 
sufficiency and timeliness of notice, and timeliness of suit in the appropriate court, however, 
will vary with the state statute.  As with the Miller Act, individual employees, or unions as 
collective assignees, are typically treated as individual subcontractors and, therefore, situated 
one tier below their employers. 
 
A. Maryland 
Maryland’s Little Miller Act88 (“Maryland LMA”) provides a slightly broader range of 
potential claimants than the Miller Act based on tier, defining claimants as “suppliers” of labor 
or materials who contracted with the prime contractor, a subcontractor, or a sub-contractor.89  
This extra tier brings in many more potential wage claimants and greater likelihood of union 
participation in the bonded project.  Those claimants who do not have a contract with the 
bonded contractor must give statutory written notice within 90 days of last performing work.90  
All claimants must file suit to enforce their payment bond claims within one year after the public 
owner finally accepts the project as complete.91  This meaning of “final acceptance” will vary 
significantly between various state agencies and has been the subject of litigation itself, as a 
blended question of law and fact.92 
 
B. District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia’s Little Miller Act93 (D.C. LMA”) is modeled closely after the 
federal Miller Act and defines claimants consistently therewith, limiting them to subcontractors, 
material suppliers, and laborers who have direct contracts with either the prime contractor or a 
first-tier subcontractor.94  It requires subcontractor and supplier claimants who do not have 
direct contractual privity with the bonded prime contractor to serve written notice of their claims 
                                                          
87
  Law of Payment Bonds 6 (2ed. 2011); see e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Trustees of Constr. Indus., 2009 
WL 1491412, at *4 (Ne. May 28, 2009); Granite Constr. Co. v. Am. Motorists ins. Co., 29 Cal. App. 4
th
 658 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1994); Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc., 687 A.2d 506, 514 (Conn. 1997); Bd. of 
Pub. Instruction, Broward Cnt’y ex rel. Monmouth Plumbing Supply Co. v. Rood Constr. Co., 166 So. 2d 701, 702 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); LaGrand Steel Prods. Co. v. A.S.C. Constructors, Inc., 702 P.2d 855, 856 (Idaho Ct. 
App. 1986); Solite Masonry Units Corp. v. Piland Constr. Co., 232 S.E. 2d 759, 761-62 (Va. 1977). 
 
88
  MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 17-101 et seq. 
 
89
  MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. §§ 17-101(e), 17-108. 
 
90
  MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 17-108(b)(1). 
 
91
  MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 17-109(b). 
 
92
  See Gen. Fed. Constr., Inc. v. D.R. Thomas, Inc., 52 Md. App. 700 (1982); see also Joseph J. Hock, Inc. 
v. Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 252 Md. 61 (1969). 
 
93
  D.C. CODE § 2-2.01.01 et seq. 
 
94
  D.C. CODE § 2-201.02. 
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within 90 days of their last work.  A suit on a payment bond claim must be filed within one year 
of the claimant’s last work. 
 
C. Virginia 
Virginia’s Little Miller Act, Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-4333 et seq. also provides a two-tier 
limitation that is similar to that set forth in the Miller Act and D.C. LMA.  Those claimants who 
do not have contractual privity with the bonded contractor must give notice of their claims to 
the bonded contractor within 180 days of their last work, a much more generous time period 
than the Miller Act and most other Little Miller Acts provide.95  Suit may be brought at any time 
between 90 days and one year after a claimant’s last contribution of labor to the project.96 
 
V. Wage and Related Liabilities under the AIA A312 Bond Forms 
 Private Bonds govern non-public constructions projects, which distinguishes such bonds 
from Miller Act and Little Miller Act payment and performance bonds.  The general purpose of 
private bonds is to limit the scope of recovery against a property owner to lien claims.97  
Private bonds are divided into either statutory or common law bonds. This paper addresses 
only the common law AIA A312 Payment and Performance Bonds.  The AIA bonds are merely 
private contracts, enforceable only upon their terms.98 
 
A. A312 Payment Bond 
The AIA A312-1984 Payment Bond form, which is still occasionally used in conjunction 
with its Performance Bond counterpart, defines the scope of bonded obligations as “labor, 
materials, and equipment furnished for use in the performance of the Construction Contract.”99  
The surety’s secondary obligation to Claimants hinges on the principal’s failing in its primary 
obligation to make payment “for all sums due.”100  Claimants are defined broadly but with tier 
limitations as those “having a direct contract with the [principal] Contractor or with a 
subcontractor of the [principal] Contractor to furnish labor, materials or equipment.”101   
 
This payment bond form further incorporates by reference the scope and coverage of 
the applicable mechanic’s lien statute in the locale of the project.  Notably, it also attempts to 
carve out the extra amounts which unions often tack on to wage and fringe claims, as 
discussed in Section II.C., supra.  The payment bond provides, “The Surety shall not be liable 
to the Owner, Claimants or others for obligations of the Contractor that are unrelated to the 
                                                          
95
  VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4341. 
 
96
  Id. 
 
97
  Law of Payment Bonds 7 (2ed. 2011). 
 
98
  Id. at 8-9. 
 
99
  AIA A312-1984 Payment Bond § 1. 
 
100
  AIA A312-1984 Payment Bond §§ 2, 3. 
 
101
  AIA A312-1984 Payment Bond § 15.1. 
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Construction Contract.”102  Although the “all sums due” language tends to enlarge claims and 
liability with interest, attorney’s fees, and other damages, this exclusion is helpful in limiting the 
scope of the bonded obligation to wages and fringes, representing labor furnished to the 
project, only. 
 
The revised AIA A312-2010 Payment Bond form is one of the most commonly used 
forms today and has retained much of the language contained in the 1984, but with substantial 
reorganization and some additions.  All provisions relevant to wage-type claims remain.  In 
addition, section 4 instructs that the surety’s obligations to a compliant Owner are to “promptly 
and at the Surety’s expense defend, indemnify and hold harmless the Owner against a duly 
tendered claim, demand, lien or suit.”   These defense and indemnity obligations apply to all 
types of claims, including those for wages and otherwise arising from the contribution of labor 
to the project. 
 
B. A312 Performance Bond 
The AIA A312-1984 Performance Bond provides that upon the obligee’s compliance 
with the conditions precedent of paragraph 3, the surety has, among its performance options: 
(i) the ability to use its principal to complete the bonded project (frequently by the surety’s 
financing of the principal); (ii) taking over and completing the bonded project (usually, but not 
always, with a new and different completion contractor); (iii) tendering a new completion 
contractor to the oblige; and (iv) paying the obligee’s damages for its completion of the bonded 
project.103  Liability for wage and wage-related claims may arise if the surety exercises one of 
the first two options – taking over and completing the bonded project.  Like the 1984 Payment 
Bond, the Performance Bond attempts to exclude claims which are outside of the construction 
contracting chain, limiting, at least in part, claims of unions for fringes and related ERISA 
damages.104    
 
The 2010 revisions to the A312 Performance Bond leave some ambiguity as to the 
surety’s scope of potential liability.  While the surety’s ability to takeover and complete the 
bonded project following default and termination remain the same,105 option number two 
above, this version of the bond form does not expressly cap the surety’s liability at the bond’s 
penal sum.106  Therefore, the surety’s ultimate costs to complete, including wage and all other 
claims, may exceed the original obligation. 
 
VI. Conclusion  
A surety’s liability for wage and related claims arises from numerous sources.  Indeed, a 
surety may be liable to laborers for various types of wage claims under federal and state law, 
                                                          
102
  AIA A312-1984 Payment Bond § 9. 
 
103
  AIA A312-1984 Performance Bond §§ 3-4.  
 
104
  AIA A312-1984 Performance Bond § 7. 
 
105
  AIA A312-1984 Performance Bond § 5. 
 
106
  Compare AIA A312-1984 Performance Bond §6 and AIA A312-2010 Performance Bond § 7.  
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to state and federal entities for unpaid taxes, and to union trusts under federal law. Awareness 
of the nature and scope of such liabilities is crucial to a surety’s ability to assess its total 
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